Iran's ballistic missile rate collapsed from 480/day on Feb 28 to ~3/day by Mar 23 — a 99% decline. This strongly suggests Iran has exhausted the vast majority of its accessible inventory. Remaining launches likely represent dispersed reserves or newly assembled weapons from surviving production facilities.
Drone launches fell from 720/day to ~40–47/day but have stabilised in this range through week 4. The plateau suggests ongoing domestic production capacity (likely Shahed-series), even as pre-war stockpiles are depleted. Iran has shifted to a drone-centric strategy targeting Gulf energy infrastructure.
Intercept rate dropped from 92% on Day 1 to ~67% by week 4. THAAD stocks exhausted ~Mar 16, Arrow critically low by ~Mar 14. Defenders are now rationing high-end interceptors and relying on less capable systems — the Kuwait refinery strike (38 drones, Mar 21) illustrates the consequences.
Both sides face depletion. Iran has effectively lost its missile deterrent but can sustain drone harassment at low cost. The critical variable is whether Iran's drone production can outlast the defenders' dwindling interceptors — and whether the declining intercept rate leads to unacceptable damage to Gulf energy infrastructure.
THAAD batteries protecting US bases and Gulf partner nations across Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are estimated to have exhausted their theater interceptor magazine around Mar 16 (day 16). The US relocated a THAAD battery from South Korea on Mar 10, but transit and setup time means the replacement interceptors are not yet operational.
Israel's exo-atmospheric Arrow 3 and endo-atmospheric Arrow 2 systems were running critically low by Mar 14 (day 14), confirmed by Semafor citing US officials. Arrow absorbs the most demanding high-altitude ballistic missile threats over Israel — its depletion forces a downgrade to Patriot PAC-3 for terminal defense, increasing leakage risk for fast reentry vehicles.
PAC-3 MSE is the most numerous interceptor in theater, deployed across all Gulf states, Israel, and Jordan. It has borne the largest share of the BM interception burden since Arrow/THAAD depletion. Emergency US resupply (Raytheon quadrupled output via Jan 2026 contract) adds a modest trickle, but consumption far outpaces production. Estimated remaining stock is now a fraction of Day 1 levels.
Iron Dome handles the bulk of drone interceptions over Israel and is sustained by active Israeli and joint US–Israeli Tamir production lines. The surge production announced after Oct 7, 2023 means this system is more resilient than the others. However, the shift to drones by Iran as its primary weapon is now directed at Gulf targets outside Iron Dome's geographic range, which cannot be covered by this system.
Interceptor inventories are classified. All figures on this tab are modelled estimates derived from open-source data and calibrated against known public reporting. They carry an estimated uncertainty of ±30–50% on starting stocks and ±20% on consumption rates. The purpose is to show directional trends, not precise counts.
| System | Est. Start | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| THAAD | 380 | MDA reported 534 total as of Dec 2025; ~25% used in June 2025 12-Day War (100–150 rounds per Military Times); partial restock + South Korea redeployment brings theater estimate to ~380. |
| Arrow 2/3 | 180 | Israel does not publish figures. Israel Aerospace Industries contract Dec 2025 signals low stocks. Estimated from the June 2025 war consumption rate and reported critical depletion by Day 14 of current conflict (Semafor, Mar 14, 2026). |
| Patriot PAC-3 | 1,800 | Multi-nation aggregate (US, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan, Israel). Based on known FMS sales, SIPRI arms transfer data, and Army Recognition deployment reporting. |
| Iron Dome | 3,500 | Estimated from Israeli production surge post-Oct 2023, US emergency Tamir production (reported ~1,000/month capacity), and multi-year stockpiling. |
Each day's consumption is calculated from the munitions data (Tab 1) using system-specific engagement fractions and a geographic allocation:
| System | Engages | Fraction |
|---|---|---|
| THAAD | BMs targeting Gulf/US bases (~60% of all BMs) | 35% of Gulf-targeted BMs = ~21% of total BMs |
| Arrow 2/3 | BMs targeting Israel (~40% of all BMs) | 25% of Israel-targeted BMs = ~10% of total BMs |
| PAC-3 | Remaining BMs (both theaters), cruise missiles, some drones | ~60% of BMs + 75% of CMs + 20% of drones |
| Iron Dome | Short-range rockets, drones over Israel | 72% of drones × 1.15 shots-per-kill |
Resupply: PAC-3 +4/day (Raytheon emergency production); Iron Dome +8/day (Israeli wartime production). THAAD and Arrow: 0 (no in-theater replenishment modelled for this period).
Calibration anchors: Model is tuned so that THAAD exhausts at ~Day 16 (per USNI/DoD reporting) and Arrow reaches critical levels at ~Day 14 (per Semafor, citing US officials). Deviations from these anchors indicate where the model may underestimate real consumption.