Iran's ballistic missile rate collapsed from 480/day on Feb 28 to ~3/day by Mar 23 — a 99% decline. This strongly suggests Iran has exhausted the vast majority of its accessible inventory. Remaining launches likely represent dispersed reserves or newly assembled weapons from surviving production facilities.
Drone launches fell from 720/day to ~40–47/day but have stabilised in this range through week 4. The plateau suggests ongoing domestic production capacity (likely Shahed-series), even as pre-war stockpiles are depleted. Iran has shifted to a drone-centric strategy targeting Gulf energy infrastructure.
Intercept rate dropped from 92% on Day 1 to ~67% by week 4. THAAD stocks exhausted ~Mar 16, Arrow critically low by ~Mar 14. Defenders are now rationing high-end interceptors and relying on less capable systems — the Kuwait refinery strike (38 drones, Mar 21) illustrates the consequences.
Both sides face depletion. Iran has effectively lost its missile deterrent but can sustain drone harassment at low cost. The critical variable is whether Iran's drone production can outlast the defenders' dwindling interceptors — and whether the declining intercept rate leads to unacceptable damage to Gulf energy infrastructure.
THAAD batteries protecting US bases and Gulf partner nations across Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are estimated to have exhausted their theater interceptor magazine around Mar 16 (day 16). The US relocated a THAAD battery from South Korea on Mar 10, but transit and setup time means the replacement interceptors are not yet operational.
Israel's exo-atmospheric Arrow 3 and endo-atmospheric Arrow 2 systems were running critically low by Mar 14 (day 14), confirmed by Semafor citing US officials. Arrow absorbs the most demanding high-altitude ballistic missile threats over Israel — its depletion forces a downgrade to Patriot PAC-3 for terminal defense, increasing leakage risk for fast reentry vehicles.
PAC-3 MSE is the most numerous interceptor in theater, deployed across all Gulf states, Israel, and Jordan. It has borne the largest share of the BM interception burden since Arrow/THAAD depletion. Emergency US resupply (Raytheon quadrupled output via Jan 2026 contract) adds a modest trickle, but consumption far outpaces production. Estimated remaining stock is now a fraction of Day 1 levels.
Iron Dome handles the bulk of drone interceptions over Israel and is sustained by active Israeli and joint US–Israeli Tamir production lines. The surge production announced after Oct 7, 2023 means this system is more resilient than the others. However, the shift to drones by Iran as its primary weapon is now directed at Gulf targets outside Iron Dome's geographic range, which cannot be covered by this system.
Interceptor inventories are classified. All figures on this tab are modelled estimates derived from open-source data and calibrated against known public reporting. They carry an estimated uncertainty of ±30–50% on starting stocks and ±20% on consumption rates. The purpose is to show directional trends, not precise counts.
| System | Est. Start | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| THAAD | 350 | MDA received 534 total (DoD P-21 data); ~100 exported to allies; ~150 used in June 2025 12-Day War (CNN, Military Times) leaving ~284 US; +45 from emergency FY2025 reprogramming ($700M). Theater estimate includes US forward-deployed (4 of 8 batteries in Gulf) + UAE (2 batteries) + partial Saudi deliveries. |
| Arrow 2/3 | 170 | ~43 used in June 2025 (34 Arrow-3 + 9 Arrow-2 per WSJ). Israel does not publish stocks. IAI contract Dec 2025 signals low inventory. Expanded production ~24/yr Arrow-3, +16 est. new builds since June 2025. Germany Arrow-3 deal diverted some production. Calibrated to Semafor report of critical depletion by Day 14. |
| Patriot PAC-3 | 2,200 | Multi-nation aggregate (US + 16 FMS partners in theater: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan, Israel). Lockheed delivered record 620 PAC-3 MSE in 2025. Based on FMS delivery schedules, SIPRI arms transfer data, and Army Recognition deployment reporting. Accounts for June 2025 expenditure. |
| Iron Dome | 4,000 | Massive Israeli production surge post-Oct 2023; $1.25B Rafael/Raytheon Tamir order (Nov 2025); US Arkansas co-production plant operational Nov 2025; multi-year stockpiling funded by $5.2B US air defense aid package (Apr 2024). |
Each day's consumption is calculated from the munitions data (Tab 1) using system-specific engagement fractions, a geographic allocation, and a shots-per-kill (spk) multiplier reflecting real-world doctrine of firing multiple interceptors per target:
| System | Engages | Fraction | spk |
|---|---|---|---|
| THAAD | Upper-tier BMs targeting Gulf/US bases (~60% of all BMs) | ~24% of Gulf-targeted BMs = ~15% of total BMs | 1.3× |
| Arrow 2/3 | BMs targeting Israel (~40% of all BMs); high-altitude intercepts | ~17% of Israel-targeted BMs = ~7% of total BMs | 1.25× |
| PAC-3 | Lower-tier BMs (both theaters), cruise missiles, some drones | ~52% of BMs + 65% of CMs + 15% of drones | 1.6× |
| Iron Dome | Short-range rockets, drones over Israel | 65% of drones + 12% of CMs | 1.5× |
Shots-per-kill (spk): Standard doctrine fires 2–3 interceptors per ballistic missile target (shoot-look-shoot or shoot-shoot-look). The spk multiplier converts successful intercepts into interceptors consumed. THAAD and Arrow have high single-shot Pk (~90–95%) yielding lower spk; PAC-3 and Iron Dome use more conservative engagement doctrine.
Resupply: PAC-3 +5/day (Lockheed wartime surge from 650/yr base + multinational pooling); Iron Dome +15/day (expanded Rafael Israel + Raytheon Arkansas co-production). THAAD: 0 (production was 96/yr pre-war; quadrupling to 400/yr signed Jan 2026 but not yet online). Arrow: 0 (~24/yr production, expanded but still insufficient for theater replenishment).
Calibration anchors: Model is tuned so that THAAD reaches operational exhaustion at ~Day 16 (per USNI/DoD reporting) and Arrow reaches critical levels at ~Day 14 (per Semafor, citing US officials). BM engagement fractions do not sum to 1.0 — the ~27% remainder represents intercepts by David's Sling, Aegis/SM-3, and leakers not modelled here.